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OPTIMIZING THE UNIT OF ACTION BASED MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION FOR HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT
We will retain our dominance on land providing the combatant commander with agile, versatile, and strategically responsive forces completely integrated and synchronized with other members of the joint and interagency team and with our coalition partners… Our Army must move toward modular based capabilitiesbased unit designs nested within the joint network and enabled by a Joint and Expeditionary mindset.
General Peter Schoomaker Chief of Staff, United States Army 7 October 2003
The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) has initiated a series of actions to ensure that the Army remains relevant and ready: a joint focused force with an expeditionary mindset. Among his principle initiatives is an effort to immediately create a more strategically agile, lethal and joint capable force empowered by an increased number of battlefield enablers and improved joint connectivity 1 organized around a concept of smaller, independently deployable and modular brigade size "Units of Action". 2 It is believed the creation of more independently deployable maneuver brigade size entities improves the ability of the Army to meet operational requirements while also ensuring that a division does not need to deploy every time a brigade size unit is required. 3 This concept of a more modular and joint interdependent force is nested in the recently published Joint Operation Concepts that describes the future Joint Force as possessing these critical attributes: fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, capable of decision superiority and lethal. 4 The CSA has tasked the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3 rd ID(M)) to internally reorganize the division during FY04 from its current three maneuver Brigade Combat Team (BCT) configuration into an organization with up to five Brigade sized Units of Action (UA) while maintaining the capability to deploy and fight across the full spectrum of conflict. In concept, the reorganized UA's, when provided enhanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (C4ISR) systems and access to joint fires capabilities will be at least as lethal as the current BCT structure fought very successfully by the 3 rd ID(M) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A major premise of this construct is that these new formations will have access to joint fires at a rate equal to or greater than that previously experienced during any prior U. S. conflict or campaign.
5
Current plans do not call for the reorganized division to be equipped with new combat systems and given the probable challenges of providing new C4ISR capabilities in the next few years, the aggregate combat capability of both the division and its UA's will initially remain unchanged upon reorganization and will only see a limited growth in capability over the next 1-5 years. While a strong case can be made that the division can adapt its new structure for employment in Stability or Support operations without significant problems, the question of how well a newly reorganized Mechanized Infantry Division or its independently deployed UA's can fight in a High Intensity Conflict (HIC) environment is not as easily apparent. This paper will analyze the maneuver, firepower and information elements of combat power 6 to assess the ability of a UA based Mechanized Infantry Division to successfully fight on a high intensity battlefield during the next 5-10 years and will make recommendations based on resources and assets realistically available to the Army in the near term to attempt to optimize its capability to fight and win in such an environment. Maneuver: the employment of forces, through movement combined with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.
THE HIGH INTENSITY BATTLEFIELD THREAT
Firepower: the amount of fires that a position, unit, or weapons system can deliver. Fires are effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. Fires include fire support functions used separately from or in combination with maneuver.
Leadership: the most dynamic element of combat power. Confident, audacious, and competent leadership focuses the other elements of combat power and serves as the catalyst that creates conditions for success.
Protection: the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance.
Information: enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and protection. The common operational picture (COP) based on enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and disseminated by modern information systems provides commanders throughout the force with an accurate, near real-time perspective and knowledge of the situation. Combined arms is the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms-such as infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation-to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used against the enemy separately or in sequence. The ultimate goal of Army organization for operations remains success in joint and combined arms warfare. Its combined arms capability allows commanders to form Army combat, CS, and CSS forces into cohesive teams focused on common goals. After Action Reviews (AAR) and journal articles concerning the decisive lethality of both the Army and the Joint combined arms team during OIF.
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The assignment of all maneuver, combat support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) formations to the UA maneuver commander really does not significantly change the training and habitually task organized operational relationships that exist in the current BCT's.
However, permanent assignment of CS and CSS formations to the UA should allow the unit to reap the benefits associated with daily combined arms task organization, training and logistics operations improving the combat capability of the formation. A smaller ground maneuver UA will have a decreased ability to perform assigned tasks in a battlespace comparable in size to that assigned to the 3 rd ID(M) BCT's during OIF. The loss of a maneuver task force will limit the amount of battlepsace a UA can be assigned, particularly in a non-contiguous environment like that experienced by the division in Iraq. 33 As a result, the division may be required to assign multiple UA's to perform tactical tasks in a battlespace previously assigned to one BCT for the execution of the same tasks increasing the C2 complexity of division level tactical operations. The reduction in maneuver forces assigned to a UA will have several other important effects. First, it will restrict and potentially prohibit the creation of a ground maneuver reserve at both UA and TF level and significantly constrain the ability of the UA commander to weight the main effort with ground maneuver forces. 37 Second, it will reduce the flexibility of the UA or TF commander to react to the unknown or unexpected enemy action. 38 Third, it will severely degrade the ability of a UA to conduct offensive operations requiring a deliberate breach larger than TF size, a tactical task highly probable to occur on a HIC battlefield like Korea. Current doctrine outlines a requirement for a support, breach and assault force during breach operations 39 and the lack of a third TF will restrict execution at UA level. Execution of the breach may require the assignment of an additional TF to the UA or another UA, even after factoring in the probable impact of joint fires targeted against the defending enemy. Fourth, it will limit the ability to conduct continuous operations on a high tempo, non-contiguous battlefield at a tempo similar to that executed by 3 rd ID(M) units during 21 continuous days of combat operations penetrating over 400 miles into Iraq during OIF. 40 Fewer maneuver formations and troops will either slow the pace of combat operations or quickly degrade the performance of Soldiers during extended operations periods required to make up for the deficit in maneuver units. 41 Fifth, maneuver units will be severely constrained in their ability to provide force protection for CS or CSS formations. This will further make the fundamental requirement for non-maneuver units to provide their own force protection even more urgent. 42 Sixth, it could potentially slow the pace of maintenance and sustainment operations as Soldiers and units focus on direct combat related tasks. 43 Finally, the tremendous reduction in Infantry Soldiers will significantly constrain the ability of a UA to execute close tactical operations common to urban areas involving clearing or dismounted fights vs. enemy Infantry. Regardless of which option discussed above, if any, is adopted, the Army must provide a fourth maneuver company for each of the two TF's in the UA. The reduction from nine to six maneuver companies that have no new weapons or system capabilities diminishes tactical maneuver potential in a HIC environment below a minimum level of acceptable capacity. This loss of capability increases the tactical risk that UA and TF commanders must accept to perform standard tactical missions to a potentially unmanageable and unacceptable level.
FIREPOWER
Perhaps the element of combat power most affected by the organizational change to a UA based division and due to change most radically in terms of how we think about combined arms fighting is firepower. A major premise of the division reorganization effort is that the UA and or division will have equal or greater access to joint fires than previously experienced.
58
The CSA has clearly outlined his vision of joint interdependence with the Army serving as a critical component of the joint team with some traditional Army requirements being met by our joint partners. 59 Recent reports indicate that the Army is prepared to eliminate or realign up to Figure 4 .
Despite the regular availability of CAS, the division utilized significantly more artillery missions than CAS sorties during these high intensity fights. 72 The 3 rd ID(M) OIF AAR characterized the importance of artillery to the division fight as follows:
Field artillery was the primary system used in the counterfire effort and in support of the close fight. The division consistently found itself short on cannon artillery as it organized for combat in this extended battlespace. MLRS proved itself as the most lethal counterfire system, although the resulting UXO was a recurring issue…. Maneuver operations of this type require field artillery fires for the close and counterfire fights. A reinforcing field artillery brigade with at least one cannon and one rocket battalion along with its associated counterfire radars is critical to support division offensive operations.
FIGURE 4. ARTILLERY VS. CAS DURING KEY FIGHTS.
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The loss of one six-tube Paladin Battery per UA will result in a significantly reduced capability for the traditional fire support tasks: suppression, destruction, obscuration and counter-fire, normally provided to support the ground maneuver commander. Further, the reduction of 18 direct support artillery guns in the division will significantly restrict the ability of both the division and UA commander to weight the main effort with organic fire support assets. Effective suppression requires dedication of one six gun battery to execute while the establishment of effective artillery obscuration via employment of smoke rounds requires two batteries to build and one battery to sustain after the smoke screen is established. 84 Under these conditions, the DS battalion would have no capability to execute fire missions on targets of opportunity or counterfire against enemy artillery and mortars supporting the enemy defense.
Execution of all four of these fire support tasks in a simultaneous or near simultaneous period would require reinforcing artillery support from division and/or the employment of CAS to perform the suppression missions. During OIF, 3 rd ID(M) artillery fired only 301 rounds of smoke as the division did not execute a significant number of tactical operations requiring the application of the SOSRA methodology. 85 On a battlefield such as Korea, this number would be expected to be significantly higher.
A 12 howitzer DS Battalion can't provide the doctrinally required minimal support to the UA for this probable HIC task. The UA must maintain a more capable DS Artillery Battalion to minimize the risk accepted. Additionally, new doctrine, geared towards more effective teaming of joint fires capabilities must be developed to mitigate the loss of UA indirect fire and maneuver capability in support of deliberate attack and breaching operations.
Further, a smaller, less capable DS battalion will restrict the number of Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFST) that a UA commander can develop and subsequently execute. Group illustrated this point stating that "tactical intelligence at Division and below lacked the fidelity and timeliness required to enable decisions-information gaps about the enemy were resolved through direct contact and armed reconnaissance." 90 Further, if the integration of joint fires is to be maximized in lieu of artillery delivered fires at the division and UA level, then ISR collection and dissemination means at the tactical level must be improved as they are directly related to the effectiveness of joint fires.
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Based on an assessment of the performance of intelligence systems during OIF, major adjustments and enhancements must be made to improve tactical level intelligence gathering, analysis and transmission capabilities. The HQDA study also recommended that the Army "provide Brigade and below with enhanced ISR means (UAV, HUMINT and SIGINT)." 92 The 3 rd ID(M) OIF AAR included several major findings that were echoed during interviews with commanders.
The Division IBOS needs an on-the-move long-haul communications system that provides secure voice and data communications, including access to SIPRNET, for all G2 and S2 sections. Division organic collection systems must include a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that is dedicated and responsive to the Division Commander's PIR. Division organic collection systems must include a tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) system capable of collecting and jamming threat signals across the spectrum. It must be responsive to the Division Commander's PIR. Expand the CI and HUMINT capability in the Army and at division level. Operational demands on tactical units require more robust organic capability for collection, for direction of operations, and for analysis.
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The 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault) OIF Lessons Learned report also recommends increased CI and HUMINT capability and improved intelligence system communications at both division and brigade level.
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The redesign of the division and creation of UA's with a DS MI Company assigned does not materially improve tactical intelligence capability. The Army should consider the following actions to improve intelligence systems in the division and UA's. First, field UAV's at the division, UA and TF level. The division should have a medium range UAV such as the Hunter (144 kilometer operating radius), 95 the UA a short range Shadow UAV (30 nautical mile operating radius 96 and currently planned for fielding to 3 rd ID(M) in FY06 97 ) and at the TF the Raven close range UAV (3 mile operating radius) which is currently employed by U.S. Special
Forces units. 98 There appears to be an acknowledgement of the importance of UAV fielding as Department of Defense UAV programs are scheduled to receive $1.9 billion in FY05 funding, more than a $500 million increase over FY04. 99 Further, the Army recently awarded a $20.7 million contract to AeroVironment Corporation for delivery of 170 Raven UAV's by 31 December
2004
. 100 Some of these should be fielded to the 3 rd ID(M) to enhance intelligence collection and situational awareness and mitigate the risk assumed by a smaller maneuver force.
Second, the Army must enlarge CI and HUMINT capability at division and UA level to provide every TF level unit, throughout the battlespace, a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT). The reality of the non-contiguous battlefield reveals that HUMINT requirements are not restricted to front line units. Third, sufficient communications capability must be dedicated to intelligence nets and data transmission. Dedicated Tactical Satellite nets must be provided at UA level and above for intelligence as well as a means of disseminating and exchanging intelligence data.
Fielding of additional, satellite based, TROJAN SPIRIT or TROJAN SPIRIT-Lite systems coupled with a global, satellite internet type system such as INMARSAT 101 will begin to alleviate this shortcoming. Fourth, the Army must provide permanently task organized access to national imagery as was made available to 3 rd ID(M) during OIF via the attachment of the Quick Reaction System (QRS) at the division and UA level. The team should include National Imagery and Mapping Agency or similar expertise and separate reliable communications.
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Finally, the Army should explore new technologies such as the 81mm mortar based reconnaissance round being developed at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. 103 A team of researchers has successfully tested an existing 81mm mortar illumination round fitted with a miniature camera that transmits images back to a laptop computer at an interval of every 17 seconds while airborne for 90 seconds over a designated target area. 104 A reconnaissance mortar round could have tremendous practical application as a TF level UAV and it appears to be a realistic goal to acquire this type of device for a reasonable cost in the near term.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Perhaps the functional area that demonstrated the most necessity for future growth based on OIF experiences, particularly if we are to leverage the capabilities that exist now in our current force and diminish the risks initially inherent in a smaller maneuver force, is C2. The Joint Operations Concepts describes an interdependent battlefield continuum that features decentralized execution achieved through decision superiority via a force that is enabled by a synchronized network. 105 Current systems in the Army Battle Command System, particularly at the tactical level, lack interoperability and simplicity 106 and the inability of the Mobile Subscriber Equipment network to meet operational requirements during OIF is well documented. 107 U.S.
forces utilized 30 times more bandwidth during OIF than in Desert Storm 108 and OEF/OIF experiences indicate a growing trend of demand for even more bandwidth to support C2 and the concept of Battle Command on the Move (BCOTM) on the current and future battlefields. The reorganized division has not significantly changed its C2 architecture or capability. For the division and its independently deployable UA's to reach full modular potential, enhancements and changes in the area of C2 must be made.
The Army must fully resource the capability at division and UA to execute BCOTM: the capability to perform critical C4ISR functions from forward locations while engaging continuous offensive operations over extended distances. An excerpt from the 3 rd ID(M) OIF AAR succinctly depicts the necessity of this capability:
The division scheme of maneuver maintained a constant operational tempo and, when coupled with the double envelopment created by the MEF maneuver in the East, unhinged the enemy defense. During the conduct of this operation the division attacked over a distance of 350 km during the first 3 days and a total distance in excess of 600 km during the first 17 days. During one portion of the operation, the division battlespace extended over 250 km in depth. Expanded battlespace and extended LOC's resulted in many unique solutions across the battlefield operating systems. A command and control on-the-move capability was essential to the operation. FBCB2, wide band single channel TACSAT, and mobile command posts were the key enablers. 
CONCLUSION: MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO OPTIMIZE THE DIVISION AND UNIT OF ACTION FOR HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT
The significant reduction in UA maneuver capability; the loss of a combined arms maneuver TF and over 400 Infantry Soldiers coupled with the loss of organic fire support and the need for C4ISR enhancements in the UA creates a level of risk for tactical commanders that could inhibit or prevent mission accomplishment. In order to fully meet the General • Retain more guns in the DS Artillery Battalion to enable execution of HIC requirements for a UA.
• Develop new doctrine to more effectively team joint fires and ground maneuver capabilities to mitigate the loss of UA indirect fire and maneuver capability, particularly in support of deliberate attack and breaching operations.
• Pursue expedited acquisition of new Artillery PGM's and field additional authorizations of proven munitions such as SADARM.
• Resource each UA with a TAB with 2 x Q-36/37 and meteorological section.
• Field UAV's at division, UA and TF level.
• Increase HUMINT capability at division and UA level to provide every TF level unit, throughout the battlespace, a THT.
• Provide permanently task organized access to national intelligence imagery via the attachment of the QRS at the division and UA level.
• Procure and employ a BCOTM system that includes three critical components: an FBCB2 like system capable of integrating critical maneuver, intelligence and CSS information; C2V's or a like vehicle platform at division, UA and TF level and sufficient SCTACSAT radios and a wide band satellite nets to enable operation of command, fires, intelligence and CSS nets at both division and UA level.
• Provide the UA Commander with a permanently assigned staff capability for A2C2, IO, PYSOPS and Special Operations. 
